Michigan Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 8

1942

INSURANCE - RIGHT OF INSURER TO BE SUBROGATED TO CLAIM
OF INSURED AGAINST A THIRD PERSON WHERE IT HAS PAID A
CLAIM ON WHICH IT WAS NOT LIABLE
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, INSURANCE - RIGHT OF INSURER TO BE SUBROGATED TO CLAIM OF INSURED
AGAINST A THIRD PERSON WHERE IT HAS PAID A CLAIM ON WHICH IT WAS NOT LIABLE, 40 MICH. L.
REV. 1240 (1942).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol40/iss8/11

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1240

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

INSURANCE - RIGHT OF INSURER TO BE SUBROGATED TO CLAIM OF
INSURED AGAINST A THIRD PERSON WHERE IT HAs PAID A CLAIM ON WHICH
IT W As NoT LIABLE - Plaintiff paid insured for damage done to his building
because of the defendant's negligence, and received a subrogation receipt from
the insured.1 Plaintiff now sues for damages in its own name and for its own
benefit. The policy provided that it should be void if the insured did not have
sole and unconditional ownership of the property. Title to the damaged property
was in the name of the insured's wife, and therefore the policy was void. Held,
since the insurer was not obligated under the policy, it was a mere volunteer,
and could not be subrogated to the insured's rights against the defendant. Old
Colony Ins. Co. v. Kansas Public Service Co., (Kan. 1942) r2r P. (2d) 193.
In order to be subrogated to the rights of another, "the person who pays the
debt must not be a mere volunteer, for the payment must have been made under
compulsion, or for the protection of some interest of the person making it in
discharge of an existing liability which must be fully satisfied." 2 While this
statement appears to set out definite requirements, the courts in their effort to
.find a basis for subrogation where justice demanded it have created a great deal
of confusion on the question of subrogation of insurers to the rights of persons
insured.8 It should be noted at the outset that in determining whether an insurance company should be treated as a volunteer for paying a claim for which
it was not liable under the policy, certain factors must be considered which are
not present in the usual debtor-creditor relationship. "The insurance company
is not a mere buyer of claims. It pays in the protection of legitimate interests,
and by this token should fall within the class of involuntary payors. By paying
it avoids litigation, and by not disputing a claim, protects its good will in the
1 This note is not concerned with the problem of subrogation arising from an
agreement between the parties, but rather it is concerned with that subrogation which
arises from the payment of a claim by an insurer without any agreement or provision in
the policy serving as a basis for it. See 8 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw 6589
(1931) and the Cumulative Supplement, pp. 49-51 (1937).
2 8 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 6588 (1931).
3 In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cherryvale Gas, Light & Power Co., 99 Kan. 563
at 565, 162 P. 313 (1917), the court pointed out that "the insurance company was not
required to quibble with the assured as to whether its policy fairly covered the floss],"
and therefore was entitled to be subrogated to the insured's rights. The court in the
principal case said that since the policy was void, an instance of subrogation where
coverage was in question is not authority for subrogation in the instant case. The court
remarks, 121 P. (2d) 193 at 196, that it is a "well established and fundamental principle that the right of subrogation is founded upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case and upon principles of natural justice." It seems that to apply these
principles in the instant case would result in the elimination of another restriction on
subrogation, and thus reduce the confusion created by the courts as pointed out in note
4, infra.
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business community." 4 Whether because of these considerations or because of a·
desire that the doctrine of legal subrogation shall be justly applied and its benefits
enjoyed where no harm will result from its application,5 some courts have been
very liberal in holding that an insurance company is not a mere volunteer where
it has paid a claim which it might have defeated in a suit brought by the insured
upon the policy. 6 In coming to this conclusion, the courts have ranged far in their
efforts to find a basis for holding that the insurer is not a mere volunteer. In one
case it was held that it is of no concern to the wrongdoer that the insurance company paid an unenforceable claim and that by paying it the insurer had impliedly
agreed with the insured that the loss was covered by the policy.7 Another court
said that although the policy was rendered void because of the breach of one of
its conditions, the insurer was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer because "It may have preferred to compromise the
claim rather than suffer a lawsuit," and that it was no defense to the wrongdoer that the insurer was not liable on the policy. 8 Waiver has also been made
a basis for allowing the insurer to be subrogated to the insured's rights. As in the
principal case, it has been held that payment of the claim, although it may have
been defeated because the insured did not have unconditional ownership of the
4
36 HARV. L. REv. 330 at 333 (1923). In VANCE, INSURANCE 674 (1930),
there is pointed out another distinction which the courts make in applying the doctrine
of subrogation; that is, "when ... the loss suffered is excepted from or otherwise not
within the coverage of the policy, there exists no duty of any kind upon the insurer to
pay," and if it does, it is a mere volunteer. It appears that the distinction between
defenses to a claim, such as breach which renders the policy void, and exception, is used
by some courts which deem it necessary to place some limit on the extent to which they
will go in finding a basis for holding that the insurer is not a mere volunteer. This may
be the rationale of the principal case, but it should be noted that the courts are not
agreed on how the distinction should be applied. See Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Cherryvale Gas, Light & Power Co., 99 Kan. 563, 162 P. 313 (1917).
And see Nord-Deutscher Lloyd v. President of Insurance Co. of North America,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1901) I IO F. 420, where it is said at pp. 428-429, "Experience does
not show that insurance companies are swift to acknowledge obligations that are without
legal foundation, and it is not to be lightly assumed that it would have paid the claims
if it did not feel itself bound to do so." In that case although the insurer might have
successfully defended on grounds of no notice or failure to pay premiums, it was entitled to subrogation on paying the claim.
5
To allow subrogation is to give the insurer an incentive to settle claims more
speedily, and it also eliminates useless litigation where the insured, by reformation of
the policy in equity, could hold the insurer liable and therefore take the latter out of
the class of a mere volunteer.
6
See Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445 (1924); Firestone
Service Stores v. Wynn, 131 Fla. 94, 179 So. 175 (1938).
The courts have ignored the problem as to how strong the defeasible claim must
be, and have relied on other distinctions in limiting the extent to which they will
allow subrogation. See note 4, supra.
7 Dallas Gas Co. v. Bankers', & Shippers' Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 53
S. W. (2d) 130.
8 Iowa State Ins. Co. v. Missouri Southern R. R., 223 Mo. App. 148 at I 50, 9
S. W. (2d) 255 (1928).
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property, operates as a waiver of that condition. 9 In view of the fact that it may
have been possible for the insured to have obtained reformation of the policy in
the principal case because of mut!Jal mistake .as to the interest to be covered,1°
thereby making the insurer liable, and in view of the special considerations which
have led some courts to adopt a more liberal attitude toward the subrogation of
insurers,11 it is submitted that the court in the principal case would have been
justified in holding that the insurer was entitled to be subrogated to the right of
the insured to recover from the defendant.

9 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rowland Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 269, II9 S. E.
362 (1923). See also Railway Co. v. Fire Assn., 60 Ark. 325, 30 S. W. 350 (1895);
Pearse v. Quebec S.S. Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1885) 24 F. 285; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Mississippi Valley Transportation Co., (C. C. Mo. 1883) 17 F. 919.
10 Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co. v. Foxwell, 234 Ky. 95, 27 S. W. (2d) 675 (1930);
Wright v. American Equitable Assurance Co. of New York, 131 Misc. 215, 225
N. Y. S. 470 (1928).
11 An important distinction is pointed out by the court in Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 277 at 281,
where it is said, "In property insurance .•. [an] insurer, who has been required by
contract to indemnify the insured for the actual loss suffered, is entitled to be subrogated
to the legal rights belonging to the insured at the time of the loss against the tortfeasor.
. • • This rule is the result of the close connection between the principle of indemnity
and that of subrogation. • . . [but] where the indemnity feature is not present ••.
(viz., life or accident insurance) the subrogation feature has no application."

